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When exercising peremptory challenges, attorneys should
keep in mind the three-step framework of Batson/Wheeler
PEREMPTORY

challenges are an
important tool at trial, enhancing confidence
in the jury's fairness by permitting parties to
remove jurors in whom they perceive bias or
hostility even if that perception cannot be
objectively verified. But as case law increasingly demonstrates, peremptories must be
used with caution, because they may draw
objections that call into question the integrity
of the party seeking to exercise them.
Peremptory challenges are "used precisely
when there is no identifiable basis on which
to challenge a particular juror for cause" and
"may be wielded in a highly subjective and
seemingly arbitrary fashion, based upon mere
impressions and hunches."' The latitude
accorded peremptories is essential to their
central functions: "to enable a litigant to

remove a certain number of potential jurors
who are not challengeable for cause, but in
whom the litigant perceives bias or hostility,"
.to reassure litigants-particularly criminal
defendants-of the fairness of the jury that
will decide their case," and to "enhance the
right to challenge jurors for cause because they
allow litigants to strike prospective jurors
who may have become antagonized by probing questions during voir dire." 2 With this latitude, however, comes the risk that peremptories may be exercised based on impermissible
criteria such as race.
The case law that has developed around
this risk has established a three-step framework for addressing challenges to the exercise
of peremptories based on claims of discriminatory intent. These challenges are known,

after the seminal cases, as Batson/Wheeler
challenges. 3 Within this framework, to effectively support (or oppose) such challenges,
counsel must understand the method of jury
selection used by the court and must be prepared to assist the court in developing the necessary record.
In 1965, in the midst of the civil rights
movement, the U.S. Supreme Court in Swain
v. Alabama first recognized that the exercise
of peremptories by prosecutors deliberately
George S. Cardona and Angela 1. Davis serve as
assistant U.S. attorneys for the Central District of
California. The views expressed in this article are
theirs alone and do not necessarily represent those
of the U.S. Attorney's Office or the U.S. Department
of justice.
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to exclude potential jurors "on account of
4
race" violated the equal protection clause.
The Court, however, recognized a presumption that prosecutors properly exercise
peremptory challeges-and placed on defendants the burden of proving discriminatory
intent. Thus defendants *were required to
show that a prosecutor intentionally used
challenges to deny African American potential jurors "the same right and opportunity
to participate in the administration
of justice enjoyed by the white
population" for "reasons wholly
unrelated to the outcome of the
5
particular case on trial." Applying these standards in Swain,
the Court found no equal protection violation despite the prosecutor's striking of all six African
American potential jurors and
despite evidence that no African
American had served on a criminal petit jury in Alabama since approximately
1950. A number of lower courts interpreted
Swain as requiring defendants to present
"proof of repeated striking of blacks over
a number of cases," a "crippling" burden
that left prosecutors' peremptory challenges
"largely immune from constitutional
6
scrutiny."
The California Supreme Court rejected
this approach in 1978, holding in People v.
Wheeler that under the California Constitution, the presumption that peremptories
are properly exercised could be overcome
with a prima facie showing based solely on
the pattern of peremptories in a given case.
Once this showing was made, the burden
would shift to the other party to "show that
the peremptory challenges in question were
' 7
not predicated on group bias alone. " In
1986, the U.S. Supreme Court followed suit,
rejecting Swain's approach in Batson v.
Kentucky. In Batson, the Court reiterated
that while a defendant has no right to a jury
composed in whole or in part by members of
his or her own race, the defendant unequivocally has the right "to be tried by a jury
whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria. '8 The Court held
that the required initial prima facie showing
of discriminatory intent could be made based
"solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the
9
defendant's trial." Further, the Court adopted
what has developed into the now familiar
three-step process for challenging peremptory strikes:
[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory
challenge has made out a prima facie
case of racial discrimination (step one),
the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation
26
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(step two). If a race-neutral explanation
is tendered, the trial court must then
decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved pur10
poseful racial discrimination.
Although Batson involved an African
American defendant objecting to the prosecutor's systematic removal of African
American jurors, the Court subsequently held
that race-based exclusions could be challenged by any defendant, even if
the excluded jurors were members of a race different from the
1
defendant's.' Also, Batson's equal
protection analysis has been
applied to peremptories exercised
2
by defense attorneys.' Subsequent decisions have extended
13
Batson to civil cases.
Though Batson limited its holding to race, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. TB., the Court has extended
Batson to peremptory challenges based on
gender. 14 The Court, however, denied certiorari in a case that would have resolved
the applicability of Batson to peremptory
5
challenges based on religion.'
The California Supreme Court's holding
in Wheeler was not limited to race, referring
instead to "group bias" and indicating that
this meant "members of an identifiable group
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or
16
similar grounds." In accordance with this
approach, California courts have held that
peremptory challenges based on religion and
7
sexual orientation are impermissible.' In
2000, the California Legislature added a
statute prohibiting the use of a "peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror on the
basis of an assumption that the prospective
juror is biased merely because of his or her
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sex18
ual orientation, or similar grounds."'
Jury Selection Methods
In California, the exercise of peremptories is
governed by statute, which provides that
"peremptory challenges shall be taken or
passed by the sides alternately," that "each
party shall be entitled to have the panel full
before exercising any peremptory challenge,"
and that the "number of peremptory challenges remaining with a side shall not be
diminished by any passing of a peremptory
challenge." 19 In federal court, there is no
similar governing statute and the only rule
addressing peremptory challenges, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b), "does not
prescribe any method for the exercise of those
challenges. Rather, 'trial courts retain a broad
discretion to determine the way peremptory
20
As a result,
challenges will be exercised.'"
federal courts employ a range of differing
jury selection methods.

California's statute, codified at Code of
Civil Procedure Section 231 (d), makes it most
likely that a California court will use some
variant of the "jury box" method. This
involves 12 prospective jurors being seated in
the jury box and subjected to voir dire. In this
method's purest form, when a party exercises a challenge, whether for cause or a
peremptory, a new juror is drawn at random
from the remaining venire to be seated, ques21
tioned, and subject to challenge. The parties thus know the precise composition of
the potential jury panel at the time they elect
whether or not to exercise peremptory challenges, but they do not know which juror
from the venire will replace a challenged
juror. The focus when exercising peremptoties under this system, therefore, is primarily
on the individual juror in context with those
in the box at the time, as opposed to the
potential overall makeup of the jury panel,
which cannot be known at the time an indi22
vidual challenge is exercised.
When exercising peremptories under the
jury box method, parties must be sure to
understand the effect of passing. The Ninth
Circuit has stated that a court may not treat
a pass as a waiver of the passed peremptory2 3 but may treat a pass as a waiver of the
subsequent ability to reach back and exercise
a challenge against a juror who was in the jury
24
box at the time of the pass.
A variant on the jury box method seats
and conducts voir dire on some additional
number of jurors (most commonly 6) outside
the jury box at the same time 12 are seated
in the box. This typically saves time by permitting replacements for jurors challenged
within the box to be drawn from a pool of
prospective jurors who have already been
subjected to voir dire.
The "struck jury" method is another common form of jury selection. Under this system,
voir dire is conducted on an entire venire.
Thereafter:
[A]n initial panel is drawn by lot from
those members of the array who have
not been challenged and excused for
cause; the size of this initial panel
equals the total of the number of petit
jurors who will hear the case (twelve
in a federal criminal case), plus the
combined number of peremprories
allowed to both sides (normally sixteen
in federal felony trials, Fed. R. Crim.
P. 24(b)). Counsel for each side then
exercise their peremptory challenges,
usually on an alternating basis, against
the initial panel until they exhaust
their alloted number and are left with
25
a petit jury of twelve.
A variant of the struck jury system is the
"blind strike" method. Under this method,
rather than alternating peremptories against
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.A prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges with
the intent of excluding potential jurors on the basis of
race violates the equal protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
True.
False.
2. Aprima fade showing of discriminatory intent in the
exercise of peremptory challenges may be made based
solely on evidence concerning a prosecutor's exercise
of peremptories in a particular case.
True.
False.
3. Only a defendant ofthe same race as the juror may
oppose a peremptory challenge directed at that juror
on the grounds that it is premised on race.
True.
False.
4. Exercises of peremptory challenges by criminal
defense attorneys are subject to challenge under the
equal protection analysis set forth in Batson.
True.
False.
S. Batson and Wheeler only apply to criminal cases.
True.
False.
6. In California state and federal courts, peremptory
challenges may not be exercised on the basis of gender.
True.
False.
7. In California state courts, peremptory challenges
may not be exercised based on the sexual orientation
of a potential juror.
True.
False.
8. When using the "jury box" method of jury selection,
a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit may treat the
pass of a peremptory challenge as waiving the subsequent ability to reach back and exercise a peremptory
challenge against a juror seated in the box at the time
of the pass.
True.
False.
9. The "blind strike" method of jury selection isinvalid
in federal court because it permits one party to lose a
peremptory challenge by exercising it against a juror
who that party does not know has also been the subject of a peremptory challenge by another party.
True.
False.
io. In the Ninth Circuit, under a "struck jury" system
of jury selection, sequentially numbering potential
jurors so that the parties know who will be the next to
enter the box may result in the pass of a peremptory
challenge being treated as the exercise of a peremptory
challenge subject to challenge under Botson.
True.
False.
1i. Because jury selection is supposed to be color
blind, it is always improper to ask the court to note the

race of potential jurors for the record.
True.
False.
12. Once a party raises a Batson/Wheelerchallenge to
the exercise of a peremptory, the court has the sole
responsibility to ensure that the record issufficient to
preserve the point for review.
True.
False.
13. In federal and state courts in California, "comparative juror analysis" is an important tool in assessing
BotsoniWheeler challenges that should be used by
the appellate court even if it was not used by the trial
court.
True.
False.
14. Some California state courts have questioned
whether comparative juror analysis may be used in
assessing whether a prima facie case of discriminatory
intent has been made at the first step of the Batson/Wheeler analysis.
True.
False.
15. In California state courts, absent a subsequent
renewed objection, a trial court's ruling regarding a
Batson/Wheeler challenge is reviewed based on the
record as it stands at the time the ruling is made.
True.
False.
16. Demonstrating a prima facie case of discriminatory
intent is impossible if a party has used a peremptory
to strike only one member of a particular group.
True.
False.
17. In assessing a Batson/Wheelerchallenge premised
on race, only the race of the jurors against whom the
party has exercised peremptories is relevant.
True.
False.
18.At the second step ofthe Batson/Wheeler analysis
of a claim of racial discrimination, the court may assess
the persuasiveness and plausibility ofa proffered rationale that is facially race-neutral.
True.
False.
i9. If a court skips directly to the third step of the
Botson/Wheeler analysis, it moots the preliminary
issue of whether the party asserting the Botson/Wheeler
challenge has made a prima fade showing.
True.
False.
20. Exercising peremptories to remove all members
of a particular race from a pool of potential jurors will
always demonstrate racial discrimination injury selec-
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the initial panel, each party exercises all the
peremptories that party chooses to exercise,
in writing, at the same time, and all the parties then present their lists of peremptory
challenges to the court. This means that contending parties may exercise a peremptory
challenge against the same juror. Courts have
rejected claims that this results in the denial
of a party's right to exercise a peremptory, and
they have repeatedly upheld use of the blind
26
strike method of jury selection.
In contrast to the jury box method, the
struck jury method "emphasizes the overall

excluded this juror. The defense sought to
challenge the waiver, but, after a "short recess
to research case law on whether waiver of a
peremptory strike could constitute a Batson
violation," the district court concluded "that
the failure to use a peremptory strike, without other evidence of discriminatory intent,
32
cannot constitute a prima facie showing."
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
because "under this particular method of
jury selection waivers of peremptory strikes
result in the removal of known jurors, we conclude that such waivers are best viewed as

tified subset of jurors (those seated outside the
jury box) who will be excluded if peremptories are passed.

Making the Record
The California Supreme Court noted in
Wheeler that the ordinary record on appeal
does not contain facts necessary to assess
challenges to peremptories on the basis of
group bias. The court observed, "Not surprisingly, the record is unclear as to the exact
number of blacks struck from the jury by
the prosecutor: veniremen are not required to

Voir dire questions and statements must be examined
for substance and consistency. Obviously, statements or
questions directly demonstrating group bias can establish
a prima facie case of discrimination and likely will go a
long way toward satisfying the burden of proving actual
discriminatory intent.
complexion of the panel" in that, by exercising peremptories, parties "are able to
determine from the initial panel not only
who will not serve but also who will serve as
the petit jury.' 2 7 Thus, the struck jury method
"builds in a preference for the parties' exercising all their allotted challenges" as a
means of removing all the jurors the party
finds comparatively less desirable than others within the array from which the jury
will be drawn. 25 Nevertheless, if one or
more of the parties does not exercise all its
alloted peremptories, the court will be left
with more than 12 jurors, and a method of
selecting the petit jury from the remaining
members of the array must be chosen. Courts
generally apply one of two methods. First,
the petit jury of 12 may be randomly drawn
from the remaining array. 2 9 Second, the
entire array may be numbered from the
start, with the result that the petit jury of 12
will consist of the 12 remaining jurors with
30
the lowest juror numbers.
In United States v. Esparza-Garza,the
Ninth Circuit addressed the defense's effort
to exercise a Batson/Wheeler challenge to a
prosecutor's waiver of a peremptory under a
struck jury approach in which the jurors in
31
the array were sequentially numbered. Of
the 28 jurors in the array, only juror 28 had
a Latino surname; by waiving its second
peremptory, the prosecution effectively
28 LosAngeles Lawyer October 2008

effective strikes against identifiable jurors,
and therefore for purposes of establishing a
prima facie case such waivers should be
treated the same as the exercise of peremptory
33
strikes."
The court cited two primary justifications
for its holding. First, while acknowledging
that the struck jury method has been upheld
as constitutionally valid, it noted that courts
and commentators had criticized this system
as "allowing the racial engineering of
juries." 34 Second, it cited the Supreme Court's
decison in Miller-El v. Dretke,35 which it
read as holding "that jury selection procedures
may give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent even though the prosecutor is not
36
actively striking potential jurors."
To date, no other circuit has followed
Esparza-Garza, and its holding is directly
contrary to that of two state courts. 37 In the
Ninth Circuit, however, its holding mandates
that under a struck jury system in which the
jurors are numbered for selection, a waiver of
a peremptory challenge must be treated as the
exercise of a peremptory for the purposes of
Batson analysis. Indeed, given the court's
reasoning, its holding may extend to any jury
selection method in which the parties know
the identities of the jurors who will be seated
in the absence of the exercise of a peremptory.
This would include the jury box variant that
provides the parties with notice as to an iden-

announce their race, religion, or ethnic origin
when they enter the box, and these matters
are not ordinarily explored on voir dire. The
reason, of course, is that the courts of
California are-or should be-blind to all
such distinctions among our citizens. "3 This
blindness to distinctions ends, however, when
a group bias challenge is asserted, at which
point "it is incumbent upon counsel, however
delicate the matter, to make a record sufficient
to preserve the point for review." 39 The obligation to make a sufficient record to support or defend against a claim of group bias
applies at all three steps of the Batson/Wheeler
inquiry.
In determining whether a party has made
a prima facie case of discrimination, the
Court in Batson provided two examples of
"relevant circumstances" courts should consider: "a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire," and
"the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire examination and in exercis40
ing his challenges."
Voir dire questions and statements must
be examined for substance and consistency.
Obviously, statements or questions directly
demonstrating group bias can establish a
prima facie case of discrimination and likely
will go a long way toward satisfying the burden of proving actual discriminatory intent.
But even absent facially discriminatory state-

ments or questions, a court can engage in
"comparative juror analysis" to identify differences between the questions asked of
minority and nonminority jurors. A significant
difference may support the inference that the
variance reflects an attempt to generate a
purportedly nonracial basis for dismissing
41
jurors based on group bias.
The Ninth Circuit has held that comparative juror analysis is appropriately used in
assessing a prima facie case; that it is "an
important tool that courts should use on
appeal" even if it was not used by the trial
court; and that it requires examination of
the entire voir dire, prior to and after the
exercise of the challenged peremptory, to permit a meaningful comparison between what
was asked of jurors belonging to varying
42
groups. Both in making and defending
Batson/Wheeler challenges, therefore, parties will need to make sure the record reflects
the group membership not only of struck
jurors but also of any jurors to whom the
party wants to point for comparison of voir
dire questions and statements, whether those
questions and statements occurred before or
after the challenged peremptory.
Demonstrating a prima facie case does
not require a showing that a party struck
more than one member of a particular
43
group. Nevertheless, a recent Third Circuit
decision suggests the crucial importance of
developing the record regarding two different
measures relating to the pattern of strikes: the
"strike rate," which is "computed by comparing the number of peremptory strikes the
prosecutor used to remove black potential
jurors with the prosecutor's total number of
peremptory strikes exercised," and the "exclusion rate," which is "calculated by comparing the percentage of exercised challenges
used against black potential jurors with the
percentage of black potential jurors known to
44
be in the venire."
The case, Abu-Jamal v. Horn, involved the
highly publicized death penalty conviction
of a black man for the murder of a white
Philadelphia policeman. The record revealed
the strike rate, which was 66.67 percent,
resulting from the prosecution exercising 10
45
out of 15 peremptories against black jurors.
But the record contained no "factual finding
at any level of adjudication, nor evidence
from which to determine the racial composition or total number of the entire venirefacts that would permit the computation of
the exclusion rate and would provide important contextual markers to evaluate the strike
46
rate." The court found this failing fatal to
the defendant's effort to challenge the state
court's finding of no prima facie case under
Batson: "Without this evidence, we are unable
to determine whether there is a disparity
between the percentage of peremptory strikes

exercised to remove black venirepersons and
47
the percentage of black jurors in the venire.",
This holding emphasizes the importance of
developing a record regarding not only the
group identity of the jurors against whom
peremptories were exercised but also the
numbers of group members in the venire as
a whole. This includes, under the jury box
method, not only those jurors against whom
peremptories could have been but were not
exercised but also those members of the venire
who did not even make it to the jury box.
Once a prima facie case is established,
the second Batson/Wheeler step requires the
party seeking to exercise the peremptory to
provide a race-neutral reason for exclusion.
At this second stage, so long as the proffered
rationale is facially race-neutral, a court can
evaluate neither its persuasiveness nor its
48
plausibility. But a court is not without the
ability to assess the facial credibility of the
proffered reason, and, in this regard, development of the record is crucial. Many proffered race-neutral reasons depend on physical characteristics or physical actions that
will not be apparent from the transcript of
voir dire. Take for example the rationales
proffered for the striking of the two jurors at
issue in Purkett v. Elem-namely, one juror's
49
long, curly hair, and both jurors' facial hair.
Whether challenging or supporting these

rationales, a court finding whether or not
the jurors at issue actually displayed these features would be critical to evaluating whether
a credible, facially race-neutral rationale had
been proffered.
Similarly, one of the facially race-neutral
rationales proffered for exercise of a peremptory in the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Snyder v. Louisianawas the statement that
a juror "looked very nervous to me throughout the questioning." The record did not
contain any finding by the court regarding the
juror's demeanor, so the Court refused to
"presume that the trial judge credited the
prosecutor's assertion that [the juror] was
nervous" and declined to defer to the trial
50
judge's denial of the Batson challenge.
The third step of the Batson/Wheeler
analysis is the determination whether the
party acted with actual discriminatory intent.
Courts occasionally skip directly to this third
step without making a finding whether a
prima facie case has been established, either
granting or denying a Batson/Wheeler challenge on a determination that a proffered
race-neutral reason either does or does not
represent the actual reason the peremptory is
being exercised. The law is clear that when
this happens, "the preliminary issue of
whether the defendant had made a prima
5
facie showing becomes moot." 1iNevertheless,
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a party cannot neglect to develop the record
on points relevant to establishing a prima
facie case. To the contrary, developing the
record regarding these points may provide the
best evidence for supporting or challenging the
trial court's determination. Particularly important is developing a record sufficient to support a comparative juror analyis regarding
selective questioning of jurors and selective
striking of jurors on the basis of the proffered
race-neutral rationale. This may provide the
best means of demonstrating that a proffered
race-neutral rationale is not related to the
facts and issues of the case to be tried and rests
instead on misplaced assumptions that actually demonstrate group bias.
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a federal prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike two single, unmarried, female
52
prospective jurors. The defendant challenged the second peremptory, a challenge
against a black woman, asserting that it was
53
improperly exercised on the basis of race.
In his defense to this claim, the prosecutor
asserted that he had removed both women not
because of their race but because they were
single and would be attracted to the defendant, who was, in the prosecutor's opinion,
an attractive young man.5 4 The district court
allowed the removal of the two women jurors.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
exercise of both peremptory challenges was
improperly based on gender, relying in part
on a record demonstrating that the prosecutor had not exercised similar challenges
against single, unmarried, male prospective
55
jurors.
In like manner, a Massachusetts appellate court found that in prosecuting a defendant for plying teenage girls with alcohol
and drugs in order to molest them, defense
counsel was properly precluded from peremptorily striking two women over 60 years of
age when the proffered rationale for striking
them-that they were too old-"amounted to
no more than a pretext and that defendant's
real reason for the challenges was to get as
many women off the jury as he could." This
finding was based in part on the defendant's
initial explanation for striking eight of the nine
female jurors drawn from the venire (including the two over 60), which was that "women
with young children would be dangerous to
the defendant in a case involving molestation
56
of children."
Of course, not all comparative juror analysis will result in a finding that strikes are
improper, even when they result in the
removal of all members of a particular group
from the jury. For example, a 2001 Seventh
Circuit decision addressed an employer's
peremptory strikes of all three women in the
jury pool in a sexual harassment trial. The
employer cited as reasons for the strikes one

woman's unemployment, another's participation in a lawsuit, and another's employment
with an insurance company and equivocal
answers about the level of her education.
Also, the employer objected to all three on the
basis of their limited work experience. The
plaintiff argued that these reasons were pretexts and noted in support that several of
the empaneled male jurors had less formal
education than the three female jurors. The
court held this insufficient to demonstrate
discrimination under a comparative juror
analysis, explaining that when "a party gives
multiple reasons for striking a juror, it is not
enough for the other side to assert that the
empaneled juror shares one attribute with
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the struck juror."
To avoid and defend against claims that
peremptories are being exercised on the basis
of group bias, counsel should take pains to
ensure that their voir dire questions and their
exercises of peremptories are used consistently on the basis of valid rationales tied to
the facts and issues to be presented in the case
at hand. They should also be prepared to
explain these rationales and develop a record
that will support them under challenge by the
court. With this approach, peremptory challenges can continue to serve their intended
purpose of ensuring the confidence of parties
and the public in the ability of the jury ultimately selected to serve as a fair and imparEl
tial trier of fact.
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